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1. SUMMARY: The question presented is whether the Free 
Exercise Clause prevents the. imposition of FICA and FUTA 
employer's taxes upon a member of the Old Ord e r Amish who 
believes the payment of such taxes to be a sin. 
2. FACTS AND Members of the Old Order Amish 





r :· social security taxes. FICA and FUTA impose excise taxes upon 
c 
employers to support various aspects of the social security 
system. Between 1970 and 1977, appe, a member of the OOA, ____.. 
employed several gther member~) of the sect to work on his farm .______.----------------------
and in his carpentry shop. He did not withhold from their wages --- ---~-___... 
FICA and FUTA taxes. Appe was assessed with a deficiency in 1978 
($27,000). He paid the amount attributable to wages paid during 
the first quarter of 1973 and instituted this refund proceeding. 
The DC held that imposition of the taxes ~uld violate the 
Free Exercise Clause. In arriving at this conclusion, the DC 
relied upon IRC § 1402(g) which exempts members of the OOA and 
other religious sects coming under the limitations of the section 
from paying self-employment FICA taxes. This exemption is based 
in part on the self sufficiency of the sect and upon the refusal 
by members of the sect to accept any social security benefits. 
The DC reasoned that the rationale behind§ 1402(g) was equally 
applicable here where the FICA and FUTA taxes were used to 
implement the social security system. "The Congress seems to 
have concluded that where . a group is both religiously opposed to 
this form of public welfare and has provided its own alternative 
source of remedial welfare, the governmental interest has been 
protected and is therefore not required." In light of the burden 
these taxes place upon the Free Exercise Clause and in light of 
the "alternate method of achieving the same e nd," i.e., the OOA's 
self reliance, § 1402(g) 's exemptio~ should apply beyond the 
self-employment context. To hold other wise would be a violation 
of the First Amendment. In Wisconsin v. Yod e r, 406 u.s. 205 
. . 
-3-
(1972), the S.Ct. recognized that the GOA's "long standing 
tradition of providins alternative vocational training within 
their own community obviated the need for public education, thus 
' 
overrode the compelling state interest to provide for the general 
welfare via compulsory public school attendance to ag~ 16." That 
same rationale applies h~re. 
The Government lodged this direct appeal pursuant to 28 
u.s.c. § 1252. That section provides for a direct appeal to this 
Court when any court of the United States has struck down a 
federal statute as unconstitutional in an action in which the us 
is a party. 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) A person is not protected from every 
c= incidental burden on the exercise of his religion that results 
from the implementation of a neutral statutory scheme. Here, 
unlike in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, supra, the appe has not been prevented in any 
substantial way from the exercise of his religion. For example, 
in Sherbert, the appellant was faced with an unacceptable choice 
between working on Saturdays and .violating the tenets of her 
religion, and foregoing unemployment insurance. Similarly in 
Yoder, members of the OOA were being asked to "risk losing their 
children from their faith or violate the law." There is no such 
choice here. The payment of FICA and FUTA t a xes does not prevent 
appe from caring for his own peopl~ as requi r ed by his religion, · 
nor does it require him to accept social security benefits. An 
incidental impact is outweighed by the gover1ment's interest in 
-- ___ .._,.._ 
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maintaining the social security system. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 
366 u.s. 599 (1961). (2) The DC has misinterpreted § 1402(g) and 
its interrelationship with the Free Exercise Clause. The 
exemption is not required, but merely permissible. The exemption 
granted for self-employed persons is simply a matter of 
legislative grace and "represents a reasonable compromise between 
the interest of the government in insuring maximum participation, 
in, and contribution to, the social security system, on the one 
hand, and the possibly conflicting beliefs of certain religious 
groups, on the other." 
4. DISCUSSION: First, in order for this to be a proper 
appeal, the DC must have concluded that an Act of Congress is 
unconstitutional. Th~ lower court did not clearly do that. 
Rather, the court appears to have held that the exemption in § 
1402(g) would be applicable here even though this case did not 
involve self-employment FICA taxes. This extention of the 
exemption was required by the Constitution. Under this view, it 
was unnecessary for the DC to strike down any tatute either on 
its face or as applied. Of course, the opinion below is 
susceptible to the interpretation apparently relied upon by the 
SG, but literally nowhere in the DC opinion does the court hold 
that any statute is unconstitutional. If this is not a proper 
l 
appeal under § 1252, there is no provision for cert to the DC and 
~----------------------------------------
DWJ would be the proper disposition. Second, on the merits, the 
SG has presented a strong argument that these taxes are a minimal 
burden upon the practice of the Amish faith and should be upheld. 
_.,.,....--- ---- -- ~ 
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( .I agree that Sherbert and Yoder are distingui shable since the 
intiusion in those cases directly and substantially burdened a 
( 
central religious tenet. Here, the belief tha t to pay FICA or 
FUTA taxes is a sin seems at least peripheral to the core belief 
that the community should support its own and that members of the 
sec~t ~ccept any YPe of social security benefits. ------- -...._...----.._____ ------- - ~-----~ Braunfeld v. Brown, which involves an incidental impact upon a 
religious tenet, provides a more likely model for the immediate 
situation. In addition, the DC's extention of the§ 1402(g) 
exemption beyond the self-employment context is contrary to both 
the specific structure of the statute and the legislative history 
of the section: "The proposed exemption would be limited to the 
self employment tax under social security since those persons for 
whom the payment of social security taxes appears to be 
unreconcilable with their religious convictions also, by reason 
of their religious beliefs, limit their work almost entirely to 
farming and to certain other self-employment." H.R. Rep. No. 
213, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965). In short, on the merits, CFR 
with an eye toward Note would be appropr !_,ate, assuming this is a 
~-----------------------------------
proper appeal. 
~S1nce I am inclined to read the DC opin i on as turning upon a 
statutory construction which avoids declaring any Act of Congress 
unconstitutional, I recommend DWJ. The parties could be asked to 
address this question. 
There is no response. 
1/13/81 Ides Opn in statement 
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Whether the free exercise clause is violated by the 
imposition of social security taxes on an employer--a member 
of the Amish faith--who believes that the payment of these 
taxes is a religious sin. 
I. Facts and Decision Below 
2. 
Edwin D. Lee, a farmer and carpenter, is a member of 
the Old Order Amish religion. The Amish believe that each 
member of the faith must provide for the other members of the 
community who are in need. They believe it is a sin to fail to 
provide for your own or to permit others to assume this 
responsibility: "But if any provide not . . for those of 
his own house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an 
infidel." (I Timothy 5:8). Because the Amish take care of one 
another, they do not need any social welfare benefits from 
outside. Because they believe in taking care of their own as 
an article of their faith, "[n]ot only is it considered a sin 
to accept," social security benefits "it is also considered a 
sin to~," social security taxes, "for to pay is to deny 
their faith." The government does not contest that these 
articles of faith are genuine and sincerely held. -
The social security system is supported by various 
taxes including 1) a tax imposed by the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA) on employees with respect to their 
wages; 2) an excise tax imposed by FICA on employers with 
respect to wages paid their employees; and 3) a second excise 
tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) on 
employers with respect to wages paid to employees. 
In 1950, Congress extended the social security 
system to cover self-employed persons, and a self-employment 
tax was levied to support this extension of benefits. In -,, 
1965, however, and with the Amish particularly in mind, the 
3. 
It "" ~ Congress enacted an exemption from the ~f-employment tax ~
any self-employed person who "is a member of a recognized ~ 
religious sect • . . and is an adherent of established tenets ~ 
~~~·4i-4y~ 
or teachings of such sect by reason of which he 1s ~ 
conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any 
private or public insurance" providing death, disability, old 
age, retirement or medical benefits. 26 u.s.c. § 1402 (g). 
Before the exemption may be claimed, the objector must waive 
all right to any social security benefits, while the Secretary 
of HHS must find that the sect has been in existence since 
December 31, 1950, and that it is the practice of the sect 
"for members of such sect •.. to make provision for their 
dependent members." 
But the exemption from social security taxes is only /3~ 
available to the self-employed. Believing that those wh~ 
~"-
opposed these taxes on religious grounds were also people who ~ 
~~ 
by reason of their religious beliefs "limit their work almost ~It -'(;4,.,. .. tl1( 
entirely to farming and to certain other self-employment," ~-
H.R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-102 (1965), th~~ 
Congress did not see fit to extend the exemption to employers 
and employees who also opposed the taxes on religious grounds. 
Herein lies the origin of this litigation. 
1A<-/-s 
During 1970-1977, Lee employed several other~ -1-o k.LL -Amishmen who worked on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He 
did not withhold the employee share of FICA taxes from their 
wages as required by 26 u.s.c. §3102(a), nor did he pay FUTA 
4. 
taxes or the employer's share of FICA taxes. In 1978, the IRS 
assessed Lee for a deficiency of some $27,000. Lee paid $91 
in taxes attributable to wages paid to his employees for the 
first quarter of 1973. He then began suit for a refund in the 
USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvania and for 
injunctive relief against the Commissioner with respect to the 
unpaid balance. Lee argued that the collection of FUTA and 
FICA taxes violated his and his employees rights under the 
free exercise clause. The district court (Teitelbaum) agreed. 
The court found that in cases of this sort where the 
right to free exercise clashes with equally valued 
governmental interests, a balancing test must be applied to 
determine which interest will yield. On the one hand, and as 
the government conceded, there was no question that the Amish 
objection to the tax was genuine and grounded in religious 
belief. On the other hand, it did not appear to the court 
that the burden on the government's interests would be 
significant were it forced to exempt religious objectors to 
the taxes. The group seeking the exemption was "clearly 
defined, long-recognized, and unquestionably sincere." There 
was no danger of "an open-ended category capable of 
uncontrolled expansion." The Amish and groups like them are 
small groups; their labor generates only a small amount of 
wages and taxes, and "[t]he loss of revenue from granting the 
exemption would be negligible." 
5. 
Moreover, the government had already granted an 
exemption from the tax for the self-employed. By granting the 
exemption, Congress appeared to have concluded that when a 
group is religiously opposed to the tax and has a commitment 
to providing for the care of its members, the government's 
interests are sufficiently protected. Just as in Yoder v. 
Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (197 2) , in which the Court reasoned 
that the government interest in the education of children was 
being satisfied by the Amish themselves, here the government's 
interest in the economic welfare of the aged and infirm was 
satisfied by the Amish themselves. Concluding that the 
government had failed to show a compelling interest, that the 
burden on Lee and others like him was severe, and that the 
risk of abuse of an exemption could be controlled, the court 
ordered that the exemption for self-employed persons be 
extended to employers as well: "plaintiff Lee, and employers 
who fall within the carefully circumscribed definition 
provided in 1402(g), are releived from paying the employer's 
share of FICA and FUTA as it is an unconstitutional 
infringement upon the free exercise of their religion." Appx. 
at 8a. 1 
1The court did not grant Lee injunctive relief because 
of the bar of the Anit-Injunction Act. Note that there is an 
ambiguity in the court's order. The court ordered a refuna of 
tfie- 1:U11 $91, 1nclud1ng that portion of the employee's FICA tax 
that should have been withheld. However, the statement of the 




A. Sherbert v. Verner and the Free Exercise Clause 
This is another free exercise challenge in a modern 
line of cases attacking facially neutral government programs 
and regulations. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 u.s. 599 (1961), 
the Court rejected the free exercise challenge of orthodox 
Jewish merchants who claimed that their ability to earn a 
livelihood was impaired by Sunday closing laws. The Court 
found that "if the State regulates conduct by enacting a 
general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which 
is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid 
despite its indirect burden on religious observance •.• " Id. 
at 607. When Braunfeld was examined in light of Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)--in which the Court held 
that it was not a violation of the Establishment Clause for 
the state to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a 
part of a general program under which it paid the fares of 
pupils attending public and other schools--a single coherent 
theory of the establishment and free exercise clauses seemed 
to be emerging: 
"The freedom and separation clauses should be read 
as stating a single precept: that government cannot 
utilize religion as a standard for action or 
inaction because these clauses, read together as 
holding applied only to the employer's share of FICA and FUTA 
l . 
they should be, prohibit classification in terms of 
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a 
burden." Kurland, Of Church and State 1nd the 
Supreme Court, 29 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 96 (1961) • 
........... 
7. 
In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 u.s. 398 (1963), however, 
I \\ 
the Court shattered the n'eutrali ty approach. In Sherbert, a -
Seventh-day Adventist was discharged by her employer because 
she would not work on Saturdays, the Sabbath of her faith. 
She was unable to find other work permitting her to observe 
her Sabbath, and she applied for state unemployment 
compensation. South Carolina denied her claim because state 
law barred benefits to workers who failed, without good cause, 
to accept sui table work when offered. The court found that 
despite the law's apparent neutrality, it burdened the right 
of free exercise: Sherbert was forced to choose between 
following her faith and forfeiting the benefits on the one 
hand, or abandoning her faith in order to accept work on the 
other. Such a burden could only be jusitified by "some 
compelling state interest." Not surprisingly, the Court found 
none. More surprisingly, the Court found that its holding 
"plainly" did not run afoul of the establishment clause. 
Sherbert and its offspring have come into their fair 
2see Welsh v. United States, 393 u.s. 333 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., concurring); Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: 
"Religion" in the Law, 73 Yale L.J. 593 (1964). 
8. 
share of criticism. The principal criticism has been that 
II 
these free exercise "' cases are 
----~-~-~~--~--~--------~---- -- !_!1 outright conflict with ~e 
Court's decisions under the establishment 
~.c., 
clause. Thus, 
" Professor Kurland suggests: "It becomes immediately apparent 
how the labeling of a case [e.g. as a "free exercise" or 
"establishment" case] may be determinative of its outcome. 
There is no doubt •.. that the exemption granted exclusively 
to the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder would fall afoul of the 
establishment clause standards announced by the Court. II 
Similarly, Professor Ely ~s that Sherbert is "supremely 
suspect" under the establishment clause and that "it should 
not be followed." 3 
3see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in 
Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1319-1322. Ely suggests 
that the only way in which to cure the establishment clause 
problem in Sherbert would be to require the government to extend 
an exemption to anyone who had a good faith moral objection--not 
simply a religious objection--to the particular government 
program. But to require the government to do so would be to 
cause "substantial disruption of state and federal regulatory 
programs." Id at 1320. 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the most recent free 
exercise case, Thomas v. Review Board, u.s. (1981), also 
points to the tension between Sherbert and the Court's 
establishment clause cases. He argues that the Court should 
return to something like th~ neutrality theory of old. He 
suggests that the Court should abandon Sherbert--neutral 
regulations indirectly burdening religious act1vity should not be 
held to restrict the right of free exercise--but should also 
adopt a less rigorous interpretation of the establishment clause 
as well--the state should be permitted, not forced, to make the 
sort of exceptions the Court required in Sherbert and Thomas. 
Note that under the Kurland/Ely formulation of the neutrality 
approach the exemptions in Sherbert and Thomas would not be 
permissible because such exempt1ons favor rel1gious objections 
Footnote continued on next page. 
I 
9. 
Whatever the merit of these criticisms of 
Sherbert, the fact of the matter is that the Court has not 
been prepared to abandon it. In Yoder v. 
205 (1972), the Court found that a 
Wisconsin, 406 u.s.~~ 
state's compulsory ~ -
education laws must yield to the religious requirements of the 
Amish faith. And just the past term in Thomas v. Review 
Board, u.s. (1981), the Court reaffirmed Sherbert 
finding that unemployment compensation could not be withheld 
from a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job because his 
religious beliefs forbade him from participating in the 
production of armaments. 
In all three of these cases--Sherbert, Yoder, and 
Thomas--the Court required the state to come forward with an 
"overriding" if not "compelling" interest. 4 And in all three 
over objections based upon conscience. 
4In Yoder the Court appeared to be applying a balancing 
test of the sort suggested by Professor Gianella in his important 
article Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal 
Development, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1390 (1967): 
A thorough~o iQg balancing test w~d m~asure three 
eJements of the compe t 1ng ~Bvernmental 1nt e rest : 
first, the importance of the secular value underlying 
the governmental regulation; second, the degree of 
proximity and necessity that the!Chosen regulatory 
means bears to the underlying value; and third, the 
impact that an exemption for religious reasons would 
have on the overall regulatory program. This 
assessment of the state's interest would then have to 
be balanced against the claim for religious liberty, 
which would require calculation of two factors: first, 
the sincerity and importance of the religious practice 
for which special protection is claimed; and second, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
of the cases the state's interests were found wanting. Only 
when the power "to raise and support armies" has been thrown 
into the balance has the Court been prepared to uphold a 
general regulatory scheme placing a serious burden on free 
exercise. See Gillette v. United States, 401 u.s. 437 (1971): 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 360. 
In short, unless the Court wishes to take this ~ 
opportunity to overrule Sherbert, 5 the Court's analysis in the 
~ . case at bar 
~~the relative 
should follow that of Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas: 
interests of the state and the individual must be 
weighed and only a "compelling" or "overriding" government 
· +V r 
~ interest will suffice to justify a serious intrusion on the 
~  
the degree to which the governmental regulation 
interferes with that practice." 
The Court in Yoder never once makes use of the "compelling" 
interest language. I believe at that time the Chief Justice was 
opposed to the "compelling" interest test entirely. But in 
Thomas, he did return to this formulation: "The state may 
JUStify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the 
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state 
interest." I doubt it matters much how the test is stated. Even 
under the gentler scrutiny of a balancing test, the state's 
powerful interest in compulsory education was found wanting in 
Yoder. 
5This would be a poor case in which to overrule Sherbert 
since the establishment clause problem is not argued. Normally 
the government would make such an argument. But since the 
government has granted an exemption to self-employed persons, and 
since that exemption would also be condemned if the establishment 
clause argument were made and accepted, the government has 
avoided the argument entirely. 
11. 
right of free exercise. This is also the approach that the 
district court used below; whether or not the district court 
properly analyzed or weighed the competing interests is the 
question the Court must now answer. 
B. Balancing the Interests 
1. the burden on free exercise 
There is no question that the required tax places 
some degree of burden on the right to free exercise. The 
district court found, and the government did not contest, that 
the Amish believe that the very payment of the taxes is a sin. 
The government argues, however, that the infringement on free 
exercise is "far less" severe in this case than in any of 
Sherbert, Yoder, or Thomas. In Sherbert and Thomas the state 
forced the individual to choose between his or her beliefs and 
economic survival. In Yoder the choice facing Amish parents 
was either to risk losing their children from the fold or to 
violate the law. By contrast, the government argues that 
forcing Amish employers to pay social security does not 
"threaten the integrity" of their faith. Lee is not prevented 
from "providing for his own people, nor are he or any of his 
employees forced to accept social security benefits." 
-~ ......:::} But I doubt that that the "choice" in this case is 
any less burdensome than the choices condemned in Sherbert, 
Yoder, and Thomas. The choice here would seem to be 
12. 
significant: an Amishman may either follow the dictates of 
his faith but not hire anyone, or he may hire employees and 
sin. Indeed, in one respect this choice seems more burdensome 
than the choice in Sherbert or Yoder. In neither of those 
~s did the government affirmatively require a violation of 
~ .... 
conscience: the government did not order Sherbert to work on 
a Saturday nor compel the Amish children to leave the faith. 
In this case, if an Amishman decides to hire an employee, the 
government affirmatively will require him to commit a sin. I 
would not make too much of this last observation, and surely 
the important point is that any distinction between the burden 
imposed in these free exercise cases is not significant. 
Further, to the extent that the government is now 
suggesting that payment of these taxes is not a "real" sin, 
and that the real sin would be to accept benefits or fail to 
aid community members in need, I do not think that the Court 
should credit the suggestion. The government did not contest ~ "J-
~ in the district court that payment of the taxes was a sin and
should not be permitted to do so now. To the extent that the ~&~ 
t . . th t th . f t . t . w.. 6 ~ governmen 1s argu1ng a e s1n o paymen 1s no a ser1ous ~
one in the hierarchy of Amish values, I think the government~ 
puts the Court in a most uncomfortable position ~ ~~ i..... 
41ft.,~ ... 
interpreting and weighting the various canons of the Amish 
faith. Such a position would be difficult to fill even if 
there were evidence in the record from which to make such 
judgments. Here there is simply no evidence from which to --
conclude, as the government asserts, that "[a]lthough appellee 
claims that the payment of the tax would be a sin, it does not 
threaten the integrity of his religious beliefs." 
In short, since the trial court found that payment 
of the taxes would be a sin, and since the government never 
contested this fact, I do not think that the Court should now 
pay heed to attempts to refine or dispute this conclusion. 
,. 
is a significant There is a 'burden on free exercise'' and it - -
one. '' More the Court need not, indeed cannot on this record, -
determine. 
2. the burden on the government 
Far more impressive is the government's argument 
that it is has a fundamental interest in maintaining broad 
participation in the social security system and indeed in the 
tax system as a whole. The government makes the point that 
the social security system, although nominally an insurance 
system, is no different from any other government program. As 
................. ~ ....................... 
with any program there will be those taxpayers who do not 
approve of it or who do not need it. Yet disapproval or lack 
of need are not legitimate grounds for avoiding taxes: 
they were, the tax system would collapse. 
Thus, the Court long ago rejected the claim that 
those taxpayers who do not benefit from a tax need not pay it. 
See Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 u.s. 495, 521 
(1937) (social security taxes may be levied on taxpayers who do 




courts of appeal have consistently rejected the refusal of 
religious groups to pay that proportion of their taxes going 
to military expenditures. In the leading case of Autenrieth 
v. Cullen, 418 F. 2d 586, 588-89 (CA9 1969) (Duniway) , the CA9 
rejected the claim to a refund of taxpayers opposed to the 
/ 
Vietnam war: / "The Income Tax Act does not 1 aid one religion, 
/. 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 1 ••• 
On matters religious, it is neutral. If every citizen could 
refuse to pay all or part of his taxes because he disapproved 
of the government 1 s use of the money, on religious grounds, 
the ability of the government to function could be impaired or 
even destroyed •••. There are few, if any, governmental 
activities to which some erson not ob'ect on 
religious grounds."(emphasis Lull v. 
Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir. 1979) ~ Graves v. CIR, 
579 F.2d 392 (6 Cir. 1978) (Quakers may not claim a "war tax 
credit" because they oppose paying taxes to support the 
Vietnam war). Cf. U.S. v. American Friends Service Comm. 419 
U.S. 7 (1974) (Anti-Injunction Act bars district court order 
enjoining government from requiring employer to withhold taxes 
of Quaker employees opposed to Vietnam war). 
I think that there is considerable strength to the 
government 1 s position that if an exemption is required here 
similar exemptions may be required elsewhere. On what basis 
could the Court find that an exemption must be made in this 
case but not in cases in which, for example, Quakers refuse to -
15. 
pay that portion of their taxes going to national defense? 
Surely, the fact that the Amish are a small religion whereas 
the Quakers are not cannot be the distinguishing factor--
although one suspects that this was the critical factor in 
Yoder. Even aknowledging that larger religions are better 
able to take care of themselves, it would seem odd to permit a 
"freer" exercise of religion by small religions than by larger 
denominations. And if no distinction can be made between the 
Amish objection to social security tax and other religious 
objections to other government taxes, then I think that the 
government has come forward with an interest that the Court 
may feel comfortable in terming "compelling" or "overriding." 
Consider further that if the free exercise clause requires 
that religious objections to taxes be 
establishment clause may then require that 
respected, the 
all who hold a 
moral objection to certain taxes be treated in the same 
fashion. Like the interest in procuring the manpower 
necessary for military purposes, the interest in preserving 
the ability of the government to raise revenues will justify 
any burden imposed by a general tax on the free exercise of 
religion. 
The strongest argument against the government is 
that it has already granted an exemption to self-employed 
Amish who oppose social security. The existence of the 
exemption casts doubt on the government's claim that the tax 
system will collapse if exemptions are granted. It may also 
16. 
cast doubt on the government's claim that social security is a 
tax like any other; the fact of the exemption implies both 
that the government's major interest is the provision of 
welfare, and that the government acknowledges that this 
interest can be satisfied when a religious community is 
committed to taking care of its members. 
The government makes a number of responses to this 
argument. The strongest of these arguments is that while the 
system is not damaged by the extension--as a matter of grace--
of a limited exemption, the system would be irreparably harmed 
were this exemption constitutionalized. Were the Court to 
find that exemptions from social security taxes are required 
under the free exercise clause, a powerful precedent would be 
established for exempting religious objectors from a whole 
host of taxes. No court has ever found the exemption for 
self-employed taxpayers to be a constitutional requirement. 
Indeed, it is doubtful that the exemption with its fairly 
arbitrary requirements--i.e. existence of the religion since 
1950--could survive were it deemed to be a requirement of the 
free exercise clause. The exemption is simply an effort to 
accommodate religious views while not unduly sacrificing the 
goal of maximum participation in the social security system. 
Perhaps one might draw a comparison to the draft cases. The 
Congress provides an exemption for those who oppose all wars. 
But the free exercise clause neither requires that the 
exemption be made nor, that once made, the exemption be 
17. 
extended to those who oppose some 
Gillette, supra. 
If this response is convincing, and I think it is, 
then I think that there is little difficulty in justifying the 
limited nature of the self-employed exemption. The 
distinction the exemption draws is not based on religious 
belief but on economic~sifi ~~_!:,ions--"those involved in an '/?. 
employment relationship and those who are self-employed." ) 
This is precisely the sort of distinction that the tax system 
repeatedly makes and must be able to make. And there is good 
reason to distinguish between those who are self employed and 
those who are not. The self-employed, typically subsistence, 
worker does not generally compete in the market economy. Thus 
the grant of the exemption does not create an unfair 
competitive edge. Moreover, the self-employed are most likely 
to possess the economic resources to provide for themselves in 
the event the religious community fails to perform its duty. 
By contrast, Amish employees may decide to leave the faith or 
become ineligible for aid from their community and find 
themselves without the resources to survive. 
III. Conclusion 
In sum, I think the government makes a telling 
argument against finding any constitutionally required 
exemptions from the tax system. Of course, it is hard to say 
that any interest is a "compelling" interest, and the Court 
does require a compelling interest to justify a burden on free 
18. 
exercise. See Thomas. But the Court also approaches the 
question as one of balancing, see Yoder. I think that the 
if1integr i ty of the tax system ~is probably compelling but most 
certainly outweighs the burden on free exercise however 
severe. I would add that as in all of these free exercise 
cases the tension with the establishment clause strikes me as 
quite unbearable. Indeed, I think that the exemption the 
government now provides violates the establishment clause. 
But the establishment clause question is not before the Court, 
and, as Sherbert indicates, the Court is willing to live with 
tension between the free exercise and establishment clauses. 
October 23, 1981 
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Memorandum to file 
The purpose of this memorandum is to emphasize some of 
the points in David's excellent bench memo. 
1. Partial exemption Since 1965, the Amish who are 
self-employed (i.e. who employ no other persons) are 
exempted from both types of social security taxes. There is 
no exemption when an Amish employs other persons, as in this 
case. 
2. A Free Exercise Case. There is tension between the 
free exercise and the Establishment Clauses. The Court's 
cases have not been consistent. In Everson v. Board of 
Education (1947), the Court found no violation of the 
Establishment Clause for the state to pay bus fare of 
parochial school pupils as part of a general program. It 
announced as a single coherent theory that where government 
action is strictly neutral, and neither "confers a benefit 






But three subsequent cases have abandoned the 
neutrality approach. In Sherbert v. Verner (1963}, the 
Court found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause when a 
Seventh Day Adventist was discharged because she would not 
work on Saturdays. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972}, it was 
held that a state's compulsory education law must yield to 
the Amish belief that they must educate their own children. 
And last Term in Thomas v. Review Board, we reaffirmed 
Sherbert, and held that a Jehovah's Witness could not be 
denied unemployment compensation who had quit his job 
because his religious beliefs forbade to work on armaments. 
In all three of these cases, the Court applied a 
balancing test, requiring the showing of a compelling State ............., 
interest. 
Although much can be said for the desirability of 
returning to the "neutrality" test of Everson, no argument 
is made here - or below - that the government would aid an -
of religion if it exempted the Amish. Rather,~ 
this case has been presented only on the question whether ~ 
the governmental interest in uniform tax collection . &t ~ 














3. Is the government's interest compelling?. It ~ · ··· 
argues that the social security system is no different from 
any other general government program. There will be tax 
payers who object - on religious or other persuasvie 
personal grounds - on any form of taxation or governmental 
action. For example: 
(a) Right to life adherents think it 
immoral to fund abortions. 
(b) Quakers think it i~ral to fund 
national defense. 
(c) Religious groups that do not celebrate 
Sunday disapprove of now obselete Sunday ..-------
closing laws, and groups that disapprove of 
working on Sunday favor such laws. 
Judge Duniway, in the leading case of Autenreith v. 
Cullen (C.A. 9 1969), rejected the claim of tax payers 
--- - ·-
opposed to the Vietnam War. He wrote: 
---------------~ 
"The Income Tax Act does not 'aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another.' •.• On matters 
religious, it is neutral. If every citizen 
could refuse~ or part of his taxes 
because he disapproved of the government's 
use of the money, on religious grounds, the 
ability of the government to function could 
be impaired or even destroyed .••• There are 
few, if any, governmental activities to which 
some person or group might not object on 
religious grounds.(emphasis added)." 
4. The Partial Exemption Argument. The strongest 
argument against the government is that it already has 




The government answers this by saying the Constitution does 
nor require the exemption. It is a matter of legislative 
grace. Moreover, classifying self-employed from employer of 
others is a legitimate economic classification. 
, .. ., 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-767 
UNITED STATES, APPELLANT v. EDWIN D. LEE 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
[December -, 1981] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to determine whether im-
position of social security taxes is unconstitutional as applied 
to persons who object on religious grounds to receipt of pub-
lic insurance benefits and to payment of taxes to support pub-
lic insurance funds. -- U. S. -- (1981). The District 
Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits 
forced payment of social security taxes when payment of 
taxes and receipt of benefits violates the taxpayer's religion. 
We reverse. 
I 
Appellee, a member of the Old Order Amish, is a self-em-
ployed farmer and carpenter. From 1970 to 1977, appellee 
employed several other Amishmen to work on his farm and in 
his carpentry shop. He did not file the quarterly social secu-
rity tax returns required of employers, withhold social secu-
rity tax from his employees or pay the employer's share of 
social security taxes. 1 
'The Social Security Act and its subsequent amendments provide a sys-
tem of old age and unemployment benefits. 26 U. S. C. § 3101 et seq. 
These benefits are supported by various taxes, including, relevant to this 
appeal, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax. FICA is an tax paid in part by em-
ployees through withholding, 26 U. S. C. § 3101, and in part by employers 
through an excise tax. 26 U. S. C. § 3111. FUTA is an excise tax im-
posed only on employers. 26 U. S. C. § 3301. Both taxes are based on 
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In 1978, the Internal Revenue Service assessed appellee in 
excess of $27,000 for unpaid employment taxes; he paid $91-
the amount owed for the first quarter of 1973-and then sued 
in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania for a refund, claiming that imposition of the 
social security taxes violated his First Amendment Free Ex-
ercise rights and those of his Amish employees. 2 
The District Court held the statutes requiring appellee to 
pay social security and unemployment insurance taxes uncon-
stitutional as applied. The court noted that the Amish be-
lieve it sinful not to provide for their own elderly and needy 
and therefore are religiously opposed to the national social 
security system. 3 The court also found that the Amish reli-
gion not only prohibits the acceptance of social security bene-
fits, but also bars all contributions by Amish to the social se-
curity system. The District Court observed that in light of 
their beliefs, Congress has accommodated self-employed 
Amish and self-employed members of other religious groups 
the wages paid to employees, and the recordkeeping and transmittal of 
funds are obligations of the employer. Only FICA is collected from self-
employed individuals. 
In this case appellee failed to pay the employer's portion of FICA and 
FUTA taxes and failed to withhold his employee's contributions to FICA. 
An employer is liable for payment of the employee's share of FICA 
whether or not he withholds the required amount of the employee's con-
tribution. 26 U. S. C. § 3102(b). 
2 Appellee also requested injunctive relief to prevent the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue from attempting to collect the unpaid balance of the 
assessments. Under the Internal Revenue Code, injunctive relief is to be 
granted sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. 26 U. S. C. 
§ 7421(a). The District Court therefore denied injunctive relief, but noted 
that should the government attempt to collect the remaining payments 
"further Court relief could be requested." District Court Op., Reprinted 
in Petition for Certiorari p. 8a. 
3 Appellee indicates that his scriptural basis for this belief was: "But if 
any provide not ... for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith , 
and is worse than an infidel." (I Timothy 5:8) 
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with similar beliefs by providing exemptions from social secu-
rity taxes. 26 U. S. C. § 1402(g).4 The court's holding 
was based on both the exemption statute for the self-em-
ployed and the First Amendment: appellee and others "who 
fall within the carefully circumscribed definition provided in 
1402(g) are relieved from paying the employer's share of [so-
cial security taxes] as it is an unconstitutional infringement 
upon the free exercise of their religion. "5 
Direct appeal from the judgment of the District Court was 
taken pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. 
II 
The exemption provided by § 1402(g) is available only to 
self-employed individuals and does not apply to employers or 
'26 U. S. C. § 1402(g) provides, in part: 
"(1) Exemptions.-Any individual may file an application ... for an ex-
emption from the tax imposed by this chapter if he is a member of a recog-
nized religious sect or division thereof and is an adherent of established 
tenets or teachings of such sect or division by reason of which he is con-
scientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public 
insurance which makes payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, 
or retirement or makes payments toward the cost of, or provides services 
for, medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system estab-
lished by the Social Security Act)." 
In order to qualify for the exemption, the applicant must waive his right to 
all Social Security benefits and the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices must find that the particular religious group makes sufficient provi-
sion for its dependent members. 
5 The precise basis of the District Court opinion is not clear. The court 
recognized that on its face § 1402(g) does not apply to appellee because he is 
not a self-employed individual. The District Court nonetheless used the 
language of § 1402(g) to provide an exemption for appellee. The court's 
decision to grant appellee an exemption, however, appears to be based on 
its view that the statute was unconstitutional as applied. Consequently, 
this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 to hear the appeal. 
See also United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U. S. 
7, 9 n. 4 (1974). 
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employees. Consequently, appellee and his employees are 
not within the express provisions of§ 1402(g). Thus any ex-
emption from payment of the employer's share of social secu-
rity taxes must come from a constitutionally-required 
exemption. 
A 
The preliminary inquiry in determining the existence of a 
constitutionally-required exemption is whether the payment 
of social security taxes and the receipt of benefits interferes 
with the Free Exercise rights of the Amish. The Amish be-
lieve that there is a religiously based obligation to provide for 
their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by 
the social security system. Although the government does 
not challenge the sincerity of this belief, the government does 
challenge the District Court finding that members of the Old 
Order Amish believe it is a sin to pay the taxes levied to sup-
port the social security system. The government argues 
that although the receipt of social security benefits would vio-
late the religious teaching of the Amish, payment of social se-
curity taxes will not threaten the integrity of the Amish reli-
gious belief or observance. 
It is not within "the judicial function and judicial compe- ? 
tence," however, to determine whether appellee or the gov-
ernment has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith, for 
"[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation." 
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec., 101 
S. Ct. 1425, 1431 (1981). 6 We therefore accept appellee's 
allegations and the District Court's findings that both pay-
• This is not an instance in which the asserted claim is "so bizarre, so 
clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under 
the Free Exercise Clause." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employ-
ment Sec., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1431 (1981). See also Henson v. Com'r of In-
ternal Revenue, 66 U. S. T. C. 835 (1976) (member of Sai Baba denied ex-
emption under § 1402(h) because although Pelig:i9wsl;s opposed to insurance 
on religious grounds, the faith did not provide for its dependent members). 
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ment and receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by 
the Amish faith. Because the payment of the taxes or re-
ceipt of benefits violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory 
participation in the social security system interferes with 
their Free Exercise rights. 
The conclusion that there is a conflict between the Amish 
faith and the obligations imposed by the social security sys-
tem is only the beginning, however, and not the end of the 
inquiry. Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. 
See, e. g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879). The state 
may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it 
is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental inter-
est. Thomas, supra; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). 
B 
Because the social security system is nationwide, the gov-
ernmental interest is apparent. The social security system 
in the United States serves the national interest by providing 
a comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits 
available to all participants, MMl with costs shared by employ-
ers and employees. 7 The social security system is by far the 
largest domestic governmental program in the United States 
today, distributing approximately $3.6 million each day to 36 
million Americans-$11 billion monthly. 8 The design of the 
7 The Social Security Act was enacted in 1935 to provide supplementary 
retirement benefits. Over the following 45 years coverage has broadened 
and the cost of the system has increased dramatically. See A. Abraham, 
et a!., Federal Social Security (1979). In 1939 the Act was amended to 
provide insurance benefits for retired workers, auxiliaries of retired work-
ers and survivors of deceased workers. In 1950 coverage was extended to 
self-employed workers and to select other employees previously excluded. 
In 1954 and 1956 disability benefits were added and in 1965 Medicare bene-
fits were made available to participants in the System. 
8 National Commission on Social Security, Social Security in America's 
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system requires support by mandatory contributions from 
covered employers and employees. This mandatory partici-
pation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social secu-
rity system. "[W]idespread individual voluntary coverage 
under social security . . . would undermine the soundness of 
the social security program." S. Resp. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., Pt. III, U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (1965), 
pp. 1943, 2056. Moreover, a comprehensive national social 
security system providing for voluntary participation would 
be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not impos-
sible, to administer. Thus, the government's interest in as-
suring mandatory and continuous participation in and con-
tribution to the social security system is very high. 9 
c 
The remammg inquiry is whether accommodating the 
Amish belief will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the gov-
ernmental interest. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 
605 (1961), this Court noted that "to make accomodation be-
tween the religious action and an exercise of state authority 
is a particularly delicate task ... because resolution in favor 
of the State results in the choice to the individual of either 
abandoning his religious principle or facing . . . prosecution." 
The difficulty in attempting to accommodate religious beliefs 
in the area of taxation is that "we are a cosmopolitan nation 
made up of people of almost every conceivable religious pref-
erence." Braunfeld, 366 U. S. at 606. The Court has long 
recognized that balance must be struck between the values of 
the comprehensive social system, which rests on a complex of 
actuarial factors, and the consequences of allowing religiously 
Future 5 (1981). 
9 The fiscal soundness of the Social Security System has been the subject 
of several studies and of congressional concern. See, e. g., Congressional 
Budget Office, Paying for Social Security: Funding Options for the Near 
Future (1981). 
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based exemptions. To maintain an organized society that 
guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths re-
quires that some religious practices yield to the common 
good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, see, e. g., 
Thomas, supra; Sherbert, supra, but there is a point at which 
accommodation would "radically restrict the operating lati-
tude of the legislature." Braunfield, supra at 606. 10 
Unlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
supra, it would be difficult to accommodate the comprehen-
sive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing 
from a wide variety of religious beliefs. The obligation to 
pay the social security tax initially is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from the obligation to pay income taxes; the differ-
ence-in theory at least-is that the social security tax reve-
nues are segregated for use only in furtherance of the 
statutory program. There is no principled way..! however, to 
draw a line between the social security tax and general tax 
revenues. For example, if a religious adherent believes war 
is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can 
be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such indi-
viduals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from 
paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system 
could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge 
the tax system because a portion of their monies were spent 
in a manner that violates their religious belief. Because the 
broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of 
such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the pay-
ment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax. See, 
e. g., Lull v. Commissioner, 602 F. 2d 1166 (CA4 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U. S. 1014 (1980); Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 
F. 2d 586 (CA9 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1036 1970). 
'
0 See, e. g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) 
(preacher not entitled to be free from taxes); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 
319 U. S. 105, 112 (1943) (same). 
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III 
Congress has accommodated, to the extent] compatible 
with a comprehensive national program, the practices of 
those who believe it a violation of their faith to participate in 
the social security system. In§ 1402(g) Congress granted an 
exemption, on religious grounds, to self-employed Amish and 
others. 11 Confining the § 1402(g) exemption to the self-em-
ployed provided for a narrow category which was readily 
identifiable. Self-employed persons in a religious commu-
nity having its own "welfare" system are distinguishable 
from the generality of wage earners employed by others. 
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs 
flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person 
cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising 
every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. 
When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial 
activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their 
own conduct as a matter Of conscience and faith are not to be 
superimposed on the statutory schemes binding on others in 
that activity. Congress drew a line in § 1402(g), exempting 
the self-employed Amish but not all persons working for an 
Amish employer. The tax imposed on employers to support 
the social security system must be uniformly applicable to all, 
except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise. 12 
11 The District Court read this as extending to the present claims. We 
need not decide whether the Free Exercise Clause compelled such an ex-
emption; Congress' grant of the exemption was an effort toward accommo-
dation. Nor do we need to decide whether, if Congress had, as the Dis-
trict Court believe, intended § 1402(g) to reach this case, conflicts with the 
Establishment Clause would arise. 
'
2 We note that here the statute compels contributions to the system by 
way of taxes; it does not compel anyone to accept benefits. Indeed, it 
would be possible for an Amish member, upon qualifying for social security 
benefits, to receive and pass them along to an Amish fund having parallel 
objections. It is not for us to speculate whether this would ease or miti-
gate the perceived sin of participation. 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is re-
versed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
This looks good to me. 
My only question concerns the Chief's 
statement at page 4, that "[i]t is 
not within the judicial function and judicial 
competence ... to determine" whether 
it is a "sin" for the Amish to pay 
these taxes. 
1. The district court did make a finding 
that the Amish believe it a sin to 
pay. Presumably it was within the 
district court's judicial competence to 
do so. 
2. Further, the government does not challenge 
the fact that the Amish believe it to 
be a sin to pay. Rather, they argue 
that it is not a very great sin, in the 
sense that "payment of social security 
taxes will not threaten the integrity 
of the Amish religious belief 
or observance." p.4. 
I think it would have been more precise 
to say in this part of the opinion that 
since the District Court found payment 
to be a sin, since the government does 
not challenge that finding, the Court 
will not undertake to determine whether 
the sin is only a little sin or a~great 
one, or whether the sin threatens the 
structure of Amish beliefs or not. If 
it is a sin, then there is a free exercise 
problem. 
dfl 
December 8, 1981 
80-767 United States v. Lee 
Dea .r Chief: 
Please join me :f.n your opinion. 
I ao, however, make one suggestion. on page 4 the 
opinion states that "{i]t is not within the judicial 
functi.on and judicial competence • • • to determine" whether 
it is a "sin" for the Amish to pay these taxe~. 
The difficulty with putting it this way is that 
the District Court did make a finding that the Amish believe 
it to be a sin to pay, and this was urged by the Amish in 
brief and in oral argument. Moreover, I do not understand 
that the government challenges the fact that the Amish 
believe it to be a sin. The government argues, rather, that 
the "payment of ~ocial Security taxes will not threaten the 
integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance". 
I should think it necessary for us to say only 
that the District Court found payment to be a sin, and the 
government does not challenge that finding. 
Si.ncerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~ltpTtlttt Clfomi of tlrt ~b ,jtaftg 
Jfasltittghtn. ~. ~· 20&f~~ 
December 8, 1981 
Re: No. 80-767 - United States v. Lee 
Dear Lewis: 
Regarding your December 8 memo, what I was a~m~ng 
at was that judges cannot evaluate "sin" in this context. 
All the District Judge did was state a fact, that the Amish 
consider payment of the tax a sin. However, I can and 
will clarify this point with a slight change. 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
C!JAMBER S O f.-
JUST! Cf '.ANGRA DAY o'C<)Nt, J R 
:~uvr~ t n; onrt t\. 
~.a·-11: tuton, 
P' 2]inih l't ~tab$' 
. iiJ. 21\ ~~ 
No. BO~· '/o 7 Uni:_l'ri c;:-ate s v. i;dwin D. Lee 
Dear Chief , 
/ 
Ple c,~t) j oi 1 n _; in , ( c o pi '1.::_o. l n the r e f erenc e d case. 
~he Chi e JL~tic_ 
Cop:i .s to the Confer._ ·l( E~ 
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~u.prtntt Clfttlttt !tf tift ~tb· .itatts 
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December 10, 1981 
Re: No. 80-767 United States v. Lee 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
l ,t'/f_ ;: -v---
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
,§u:vrme <!Jourl of ~t ~fuittb .§tafe.s' 
Jliut!rington, ~. Qf. ZO,?J!~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE December 14, 1981 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
bkh 
.:§ttp-rtmt <!Jam cf lift ffilt~ f!fi a 
2lfasfrht.gtctt, ~· <!J. 2Dbl>!~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN December 30, 1981 
/ 
Re: No. 80-767 - United States v. Lee 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
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.§u:prttttt <!Jcnrl cf tfre ~b ~ta:teg 
'Jllrrur!p:ttgtcn. ~. <!}. 20gt>t.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .... J. BRENNAN, JR. December 30, 1981 





The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
> .,. 
.§u:prttnt <!Jttttd of Urt ~niub- ~tlrlt.&' 
~as<J.ri:ngtcn.tB. <q. 2!lgt'l<~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 7, 1982 
Re: 80-767 - United States v. Lee 
Dear Chief: 
With apologies for being so slow, I can now say 
that I have decided to write a separate concurrence. 
I will try not to hold you up too long. 
Respectfully, 
·(!L 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~u:prtttu> <!fcurt of tqt 'Jllnilib !5> _eg 
'UlasJringtcn. t3. <!f. 211.?1!~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
I 
January 29, 1982 
Re: No. 80-767 - United States v. Lee 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
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